

CLARIFICATIONS δ
TO APPENDIX #10A

CYNICISM
AND
OTHERS.

Cynicism and Russell.

**My Philosophical Development.
Chapters 4 and 7.**

1. ...I would still agree with its negative part -- i.e. with the doctrine that facts in general independent from experience.

I think that this universe is the totality of interacting things, which the interaction cannot be actually fixed/cannot be considered as a fact(a complete picture of SOMETHING) as long as this universe exists in the present continuous time.

2. I think that Moore was most concerned with the rejection of idealism, while I was most interested in the rejection of monism. The two were, however, closely connected. They were connected through the doctrine as to relations, which Bradley had distilled out of the philosophy of Hegel. I called this 'the doctrine of internal relations', and I called my view 'the doctrine of external relations. The doctrine of internal relations held that every relation between two terms expresses, primary, intrinsic properties of the two terms and, in ultimate analysis, a property of the whole which the two compose.

All things which are, are in themselves (they can be conceived as units of many) and always interact with others (they can be viewed as one among many); all that can be conceived through another thing may also be detected through changes within a Given union -- through itself.

3. Even an atheist must admit that a man can love God. It follows that love of God is a state of the man who feels it, and not properly a relational fact.

If we have the statement "John believes in God" the answer to the question 'How are we using 'God' in 'John believes that there is God?' is: John somehow needs to use God or the idea of a God because it (either the idea or God) can decrease John's Meaning of Inertia.

4. Leibniz gives an extreme example. He says that, if a man living in Europe has a wife in India and the wife dies without his knowing it, the man undergoes an intrinsic change at the moment of her death.

There is no a moment of time 'right now' and everything is becoming that which it was not -- any change of any part of the Whole/the Whole itself will sooner or later influence all its part/the Whole itself even if these/these changes/change are/is not manifested instantaneously: any change/changes of SOMETHING

shall manifest itself/themselves.

5. The axiom of internal relations is either form involves, as Mr. Bradley has justly urged [cf. *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed., p. 519: 'Reality is one. It must be single because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity'], the conclusion that there are no relations and that there are not many things, but only one thing.

I would add: in the end. But that only means that for the end should not be just any last thing, but the best.

6. We cannot take 'different from B' as an adjective from a relation requiring no further reduction, since we must ask what is meant by 'different' in this phrase, which, as it stands, derives an adjective from a relation, not a relation from an adjective.

Thus, if there is to be any diversity, there must be diversity reducible to different Meanings of Inertia for any part of substance and to a number of a thing's Pair of Moduces of Inertia in the Set T.

7. Thus the axiom of internal relations is equivalent to the assumption of ontological monism and to the denial that there are any relations. Wherever we seem to have a relation, this is really an adjective of the whole composed of the terms of the supposed relation.

There is only one kind of relation between things and it is the interaction between them. The Whole does not interact with SOMETHING: the Whole is the condition of substance: the diversity between parts of the Whole is a diversity that is reducible to difference in words.

8. The axiom internal relation is thus equivalent to the assumption that every proposition has one subject and one predicate. For a proposition which asserts a relation must always be reduced to a subject-predicate proposition concerning the whole composed to the terms of the relation. Proceeding in this way to larger and larger wholes, we gradually correct out first crude abstract judgments, and approximate more and more to the one truth about the whole. The one final and complete truth must consist of a proposition with one subject, namely, the whole, and one predicate.

There are no elementary propositions: there are no a sense-datum which can exist independently from all other perceptions; there is only one kind of sense-data -- the sense-data that is to become/is becoming the view of the Whole which cannot be put into words -- Pure Knowledge.

9. There is first the law of sufficient reason, according to which nothing can be just a brute fact, but must have some reason for being thus and not otherwise.

There is not a concept of a thing that can exist without an object inspiring its existence: all things are objects for the certain monotheistic Law immanent in substance that determines the interaction between all parts of substance in their striving to become the Whole; where any part of substance, as of the Whole, is Nonpredicatively defined: it is impossible to give a Whole definition of any part of substance if its Interaction with all the other parts of substance is not defined; modification of one part of substance is a modification of all the remaining parts of substance.

10. Thus the law of sufficient reason should mean that every proposition can be deduced from simpler proposition.

*I state that any proposition strives to be as simple as only **NOTHING**(which does not have any connotation or structure within itself) is -- this means that every proposition, which is better than a preceded one, must be reduced from an equivocal propositions -- the starting point is a most complicated proposition and the result must be the absence of all propositions or, what is the same, the simplest proposition.*

11. A more searching argument against the axiom of internal relations is derived from a consideration of what is meant by the 'nature' of a term. Is this the same as the term itself, or is it different? If it is different, it must be related to the term, and the relation of a term to its nature cannot, without an endless regress, be reduced to something other than a relation. Thus if the axiom is to be adhered to, we must suppose that a term is not other than its nature. In that case, every true proposition attributing a predicate to a subject is purely analytic, since

*I think that the existence of predicates signifies the existence of substance as of **SOMETHING**. And the only true proposition for and of any part of substance -- Pure Knowledge -- does not exist as long as this part of substance has opinions-propositions -- is **SOMETHING**. So, I assume that the only true proposition is the Limit, which any proposition strives to maintain: **SOMETHING** is becoming **NOTHING**.*

the subject is its own whole nature, and the predicate is part of that nature. But in this case, what is the bond that unites predicates into predicates of one subject? Any casual collection of predicates might be supposed to compose a subject, if subjects are not other than the system of their own predicates. If the 'nature' of a term is to consist of predicates, and at the same time to be the same as the term itself, it seems impossible to understand what we mean: 'Is P one of the predicates enumerated in explaining what we mean by S?' and it is hard to see what else, on the view in question, it could mean. Again, the axiom of internal relations is incompatible with all complexity. For this axiom leads, as we saw, to a right monism. The one proposition (which is not merely the only true proposition, but the only proposition) attributes a predicate to the one subject. But this one proposition is not quite true, because it involves distinguishing the predicate from the subject.

12. But it is essential to the philosophy we are examining to deny absolute identity, and retain 'identity in difference'. The apparent multiplicity of the real world is otherwise inexplicable.

Any closed set -- the Whole -- has a power equal to the power of the empty set and, therefore, there is the singularity of the empty set: two plus two is not equal to four! This is the definition of absolute identity!

13. The difficulty is that 'identity of difference' is impossible, if we adhere to strict monism. For 'identity in difference' involves many partial truths, which combine, by a kind of mutual give and take, into the one whole of truth. But the partial truths, in a strict monism, are not merely not quite true: they do not subsist at all. If there were such propositions, whether true or false, that would give plurality.

There are not 'the partial truth': there is an opinion; one's view of the world strives to become the only complete knowledge of the universe -- Pure Knowledge!

14. 'Identity in difference' disappears: there is identity and there is difference, and complexes may have some elements identical and some different, but we are no longer obliged to say of any pair of objects that may be mentioned that they are both identical and different -- 'in a sense', that 'sense' being something which it is vitally necessary to leave undefined.

I define this 'sense': there is the plurality of parts of the Whole and there is the singularity of the Whole; where the Whole is a condition of the only substance.

15. In this world, whatever is complex is composed of related simple things, and analysis is no longer confronted at every step by an endless regress.

What does mean 'complex thing'? What does mean 'simple thing'? I have not to examine 'an endless regress' because I suggest that there is progress -- everything is becoming NOTHING.

I believed in a world of universals, consisting mostly of what is constant by verbs and prepositions.

I maintain that it is not quite true that two plus two are two -- universals do not exist.

CLARIFICATIONS β
TO THE APPENDIX #10A.

CONCERNING THE CONCEPTION OF
CYNICAL SPIRITUALISM.

Clarification 23. The universe is declared by Cynicism to be spiritual -- it is conscious; it is intelligent; it is purposeful.

People do not possess a quality that makes them superior to things which seem to be inanimate -- human beings have equal rights among equal.